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Paying Unpayable Debts: Juvenile
Restitution and Its Shortcomings in
Hennepin County, Minnesota
Anwen Parrott†
Introduction
A few weeks before the end of his freshman year in high school,
Adam1 met up with a group of his friends at a park near his home.
As a fourteen-year-old growing up in a small suburban town outside
of the Twin Cities, Adam felt insulated by the rules his parents set
and the lack of freedom that he had. He was antsy for the end of the
school year and bored by his daily routine. Most significantly,
however, he was fourteen and impulsive, so when a friend noticed
that the park’s groundskeeper had neglected to return a crowbar
and an axe to the small groundskeeping shed where the tools were
stored, Adam joined his friends in picking up and examining the
forgotten tools. Adam began playfully swinging the crowbar and,
before long, he and his friends were hitting a park bench and the
shed with the tools, damaging both. The police promptly arrived and
arrested Adam, who was later charged with criminal damage to
property and ordered to pay over $10,000 to the city.2 Adam did not
have a job. His parents lived paycheck to paycheck and were unable
to contribute anything beyond a few dollars to his monthly
restitution payment. They shared this information with the court,
hoping that the restitution order would be reduced, yet the order
stood in full.
For Adam and other youth in his position, the journey towards
making restitution often continues long after a court orders it.

†. J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to Grace
O’Meara and Professor JaneAnne Murray for their guidance during the writing
process, and to the Hennepin County public defenders who introduced me to the
inequities in our juvenile restitution system.
1. The facts of Adam’s case are based upon those of In re Welfare of I.N.A., 902
N.W.2d 635 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), though a few details are embellished or changed,
including the Defendant’s name, to protect identity.
2. In Hennepin County, juveniles and adults alike can be held jointly and
severally liable for restitution. See State v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60, 66 (Minn. 2014).
In Adam’s case, as in many cases resulting in a restitution order, it did not matter
how much damage he individually contributed to, for he was on the hook for the
whole amount. Id.
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Unpaid restitution orders begin accumulating interest—and, if still
unpaid by the age of eighteen, transition into a civil judgment.3 As
such, restitution orders pinned upon juveniles can follow these
individuals into adulthood. Unpaid restitution orders seep into
choices about whether to pursue post-secondary education or to
forego college to pay down an accumulating debt. When money gets
tight, tense calculations about whether to pay an electric bill, rent,
or restitution follow.4 In other cases, the restitution order is simply
ignored—but with this approach, too, come the consequences of
debt, civil judgments, and probation violations for failure to comply
with the restitution order.5
Adam’s story is not unusual. Throughout Hennepin County
and the state of Minnesota at large, courts order justice-involved
youth6 to pay restitution in amounts that, given the children’s
financial situations, are quite literally unpayable. A child too young
to legally work was ordered to pay over $3,000 after hitting a car
with his skateboard.7 A sixteen-year-old was required to pay nearly
$2,000 in restitution after participating in a fight that landed him
in the hospital, despite the fact that both he and his mother were
unemployed or underemployed.8

3. Restitution, HENNEPIN CNTY. ATT’Y’S OFF., https://www.hennepin
attorney.org/cases/adult-felonies/restitution [perma.cc/WL5P-G6YZ]. If a defendant
does not begin payment within sixty days, the restitution they owe may be entered
as a civil judgment and/or referred to the Minnesota Department of Revenue, where
a “collection fee of up to 25%” is added to their outstanding restitution. Id. The
Department of Revenue may “levy (take) property and assets,” such as wages, tax
refunds, and bank accounts to cover the unpaid debts, and can even revoke
professional licenses—seemingly complicating payment even further. Id.
4. The impacts of restitution on individuals living in poverty is extreme.
Restitution orders received while still in the juvenile system strain a family to the
point of homelessness. See Eli Hager, Punishing Kids with Years of Debt, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 11, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/
06/11/punishing-kids-with-years-of-debt [perma.cc/UJ35-34RJ].
5. MINN. STAT. § 260b.198(8).
6. The term “justice-involved youth” describes children accused of committing a
delinquent or criminal act. See Precious Skinner-Osei, Laura Mangan, Mara Liggett,
Michelle Kerrigan & Jill S. Levinson, Justice-Involved Youth and Trauma-Informed
Interventions, JUST. POL’Y J., Fall 2019, at 2. Occasionally, the term is viewed more
narrowly, to incorporate only the population of youth incarcerated in juvenile or
adult facilities. See Justice Involved Youth, AM. YOUTH POL’Y F.,
https://www.aypf.org/youth-populations/juvenile-justice/
[perma.cc/44U5-BSBR].
This Note incorporates the broader meaning of the word.
7. In re Welfare of L.F.M., No. A13-0541, 2013 WL 5778221, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Oct. 28, 2013).
8. In re Welfare of N.A.B., No. A13-0270, 2013 WL 5676920, at *1–2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Oct. 21, 2013) (finding the district court sufficiently considered N.A.B.’s ability
to pay restitution and affirming the restitution order to pay $1,763.90 in spite of his
mother’s statement that she “[doesn’t] make any money”).
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While these virtually unpayable orders are handed down in
district courts, burdening children and teenagers with debts that
loom larger over time (quite literally, due to the interest or
collections costs that attach to unpaid court fines), without a
significant increase in ability to pay even as these children
transition into adulthood, restitution programs are nationally
lauded for their capacity to make a victim “whole” while holding the
responsible party personally accountable.9 Scholars have focused
particular attention on the positive impact that restitution might
wield in the juvenile court system, theorizing that restitution aids
in the rehabilitation that courts have increasingly identified10 as
the goal of juvenile court.11 Yet this literature routinely overlooks a
practical reality: restitution programs are not likely to have a
positive impact on children and teenagers required to pay more
money than they (or their immediate and extended families) can
afford to pay. What’s more, when judges set restitution without
regard for an individual’s ability to pay, these orders are unlikely to
provide financial support to victims of a crime, thus injuring the
parties restitution was intended to uplift.12
9. Stacy Hoskins Haynes, Alison C. Cares & R. Barry Ruback, Juvenile
Economic Sanctions: An Analysis of Their Imposition, Payment, and Effect on
Recidivism, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 31, 36, 51 (2014).
10. For an overview of the United States Supreme Court’s recognition of a
rehabilitative framework in juvenile law (prior to Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259,
slip op. R-30 (Apr. 22, 2021)), see generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
(finding the death penalty a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
when given to offenders who committed their crimes when they were under 18 years
old), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (finding a sentence of lifetime
incarceration without parole is a violation of the Eighth Amendment when given to
juveniles), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (finding that
offenders who committed their crimes as juveniles must be given the opportunity to
demonstrate that their crime did not indicate “irreparable corruption”). The Roper
and Miller line of cases rely on juvenile brain science and societal values to conclude
that juveniles are “categorically less culpable than the average criminal,” Roper, 542
U.S. at 552 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)), and that the
“penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders,
even when they commit terrible crimes” are thus diminished. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472.
Punishment accorded to juveniles, the Court reasoned, must allow some meaningful
opportunity for release based upon demonstrated growth and rehabilitation. Id. at
479. But see Jones v. Mississippi, no. 18-1259, slip op. R-30 (Apr. 22, 2021) (finding
that a sentencer does not need to make any official finding of “permanent
incorrigibility” before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole).
11. Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 35.
12. Numerous studies tracking restitution orders suggest that this type of courtordered payment largely goes unpaid. One study tracking payments of a subsample
of individuals with felony-level offenses found that nearly 77% of the restitution they
had been assessed went unpaid. Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett,
Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary
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This Note will examine the history of juvenile restitution,
focusing specifically on its historical and current practice within
Hennepin County in Minnesota.13 It will argue that Hennepin
County’s juvenile restitution program potentially harms, rather
than rehabilitates, justice-involved youth and, in response, it
advocates for a shift in statutory interpretation to take seriously the
financial needs and limitations of youth. This Note also argues that
despite being classified alongside “restorative justice” programs,
restitution, as currently implemented, is more punitive than
restorative for low-income individuals and thus does not align with
the rehabilitative purpose of juvenile court. In Part I, this Note
explores the historical use of restitution in criminal courts
throughout the United States, the implementation of restitution
programs in both adult and juvenile courts in Minnesota, and the
widespread celebration of the practice that arises in scholarship
about restitution (despite its inconclusive success rates). In Part II,
this Note emphasizes the importance of restorative justice and
rehabilitation, particularly in the lives of youth, and argues that the
restitution program in Hennepin County, on the whole, fails to
serve a restorative or rehabilitative purpose. Finally, Part III of this
Note considers solutions. It advocates for changes to the
interpretation of Minnesota Statutes Sections 260b.198 and
611A.045 to encourage courts to more fully consider a juvenile’s
ability to pay restitution, and urges the restitution juveniles face be
“reasonable.” This Note also considers creative solutions, including
the enactment of a county-wide restitution fund to compensate
victims when a juvenile defendant cannot afford to pay, and
proposes some alternative approaches that could more successfully
consider and repair the harm caused by youth adjudicated
delinquent.

United States, 115 AM. J. SOCIO. 1753, 1774 (2010). Unfortunately, these unpaid
restitution orders disproportionately impact poor communities. R. Barry Ruback,
The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions: Considering the Victim, the Offender,
and Society, 269 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1788 (2015) (“The problems usually faced by
offenders are also faced by victims—they are disproportionately poor, unemployed,
unskilled, and racial/ethnic minorities.”).
13. Restitution programs vary remarkably from state to state. While much of
what is discussed within this Note is relevant on a national scale, solutions should
be tailored to individual states, counties, or even cities.
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Background: What Is Restitution and Why Do We Use
It?
A. Defining Restitution and Understanding Its Growing
Popularity

Like other court fines and fees, restitution is a payment
ordered upon the trial court’s discretion after a defendant is
convicted of a crime—or, in the case of a juvenile defendant, after
they have been adjudicated delinquent by the court. 14 Unlike fines
and fees that are somewhat standardized,15 restitution is a payment
from a defendant to the victim of the crime to compensate for the
unique harm caused by their wrongful acts.16 Restitution orders
vary dramatically, as courts discretionarily order monetary
restitution for the tangible harm sustained in a given incident 17—
which may broadly include damage to property, medical or therapy
bills, or funeral costs.18 Legal scholars and social scientists alike
have opined about the transformative impact that restitution can
have, theorizing that restitution orders force defendants to not only
reimburse victims for the direct harm that they created, but also to
reckon with the full magnitude of loss that they caused, in both
monetary and philosophical terms.19
While the concept of restitution and the notions of
accountability embedded within it (i.e., that a responsible party
compensates an innocent party for an injury or loss that they
caused) have ancient roots,20 court systems in the United States did
14. MINN. STAT. § 611A.04(1); Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines
Clause, 102 CAL. L. REV. 2 (2014); Steven H. David & Cale J. Bradford, Crime Does
Not Pay: Understanding Criminal Debt, 50 IND. L. REV. 1051, 1075 (2017).
15. For example, many fines, fees, and court costs are established at a set amount
and automatically applied upon the conclusion of a case.
16. Restitution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Compensation for
loss; esp., full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to a victim, not awarded in
a civil trial for tort, but ordered as a part of a criminal sentence or as a condition of
probation.”); see also Restitution, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200106012317/https://victimsofcrime.org/help-forcrime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/restitution] (providing a guide for
victims of crime about what restitution is and sharing strategies to ensure that it is
collected).
17. Harris et al., supra note 12, at 1774 (tracking restitution orders in felony
cases ranging from $500 to a staggering $256,257).
18. Ryan Anderson, The System is Rigged: Restitution Is Blind to the Victim’s
Fault, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 140, 149 (2017).
19. David & Bradford, supra note 14, at 1075.
20. Scholars have traced restitution’s roots to ancient indigenous and religious
traditions. See Nancy Lucas, Restitution, Rehabilitation, Prevention, and
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not begin to implement structured restitution programs in any
widespread manner until the 1970s. 21 The rise of restitution within
the justice system reflected a change in society at large.
Spearheaded by the Victim’s Rights Movement in the early 1970s,22
the narrative around crime, punishment, and justice shifted from
marginally considering the victim’s wants and needs to centering
the victim’s views of what a successful resolution to their case would
look like.23 Critics and commentators declared restitution a
valuable—even restorative—factor in ensuring that justice was
done for the victim.24 Currently, all states have statutory provisions
permitting restitution25 and fourteen states, including Minnesota,
demonstrate their commitment to ensuring restitution is paid by
levying civil judgments against individuals with outstanding
restitution orders.26
It did not take long for courts and scholars to note that
restitution seemed particularly suited to juvenile court, where
traditional incarceration is often neither desired nor appropriate.27
Resultingly, there exists a “shortage of useful sentencing options”
by which justice-involved youth may be punished or held

Transformation: Victim-Offender Mediation for First-Time Non-violent Youthful
Offenders, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1365, 1370 (2001); Anderson, supra note 18, at 148–
49.
21. Burt Galaway, Is Restitution Practical?, 41 FED. PROBATION 3, 3 (1977)
(“During 1976 and 1977 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has
systematically funded a series of pilot adult and juvenile restitution programs to
further test the feasibility of using this concept in the criminal justice system.”).
22. See generally History of Victims’ Rights, NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST.,
https://law.lclark.edu/centers/national_crime_victim_law_institute/about_ncvli/hist
ory_of_victims_rights/ [perma.cc/3P2S-LF5H] (discussing the history of the Modern
Crime Victims’ Rights Movement).
23. Ruback, supra note 12, at 1788.
24. Id.
25. Susan Jacobs & David C. Moore, Successful Restitution as a Predictor of
Juvenile Recidivism, 45 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 3, 3–4 (1994).
26. See, e.g., RESTITUTION: COLLECTING CIVIL JUDGMENTS RESULTING FROM
RESTITUTION ORDERS, CARVER CNTY., MINN., https://www.co.carver.mn.us/home/
showdocument?id=12300 [perma.cc/L4JP-86NG] (“Judges can order the restitution
converted into a civil judgment if the offender has not paid in full and the offender’s
probationary period is expiring. Crime victims can file an Affidavit of Identification
of Judgment Debtor along with a copy of the Restitution Order to start the Civil file
for the amount owed to them. This process can be done immediately after the Order
for Restitution has been Ordered.”); see also Ruback, supra note 12, at 1794.
27. See generally Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (finding a sentence
of lifetime incarceration without parole a violation of the Eighth Amendment when
given to juveniles). But see Jones v. Mississippi, no. 18-1259, slip op. R-30 (Apr. 22,
2021).
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accountable.28 Today, all but one state has added an additional
statute or provision directly governing juvenile restitution. 29
B. Restitution in Minnesota: Past and Present
Likely guided by the nationwide trend,30 Minnesota first
enacted a criminal restitution statute, Section 611A.04, in 1983. 31
This original statute operated with very few procedural
requirements and solely considered the financial losses that a
victim self-reported: the victim would submit an itemized list of the
losses they sustained to the court, and the court would issue
restitution in that amount.32 Shortly after the original statute’s
enactment, the Minnesota Legislature enacted Section 611A.045, 33
which widened (albeit only slightly) the factors that a court was
required to consider before issuing a restitution award. 34 By 1989,
the Legislature updated Section 611A.045 to include a few basic
requirements that remain virtually untouched to date: 35 the trial
court was mandated to weigh “the amount of economic loss
sustained by the victim as a result of the offense; and the income,
resources, and obligations of the defendant.”36
Although this new addition seemed to provide an opportunity
for more nuanced and complex restitution orders, case law
interpreting these requirements somewhat foreclosed this
possibility. Courts have since held that when “balancing” the
monetary loss sustained and the defendant’s ability to pay, the trial
court judge can tip the scales to (heavily) favor the victim; a judge
can order restitution without making any specific findings about a
defendant’s ability to pay, even if there is a potential financial
hardship to the defendant and their family.37 After receiving a

28. Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 35.
29. For a thorough compilation of juvenile restitution statutes across the United
States, see Juvenile Restitution Statutes, NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR. (Mar. 2015),
https://njdc.info/juvenile-restitution-statutes/ [perma.cc/ZRP3-457J].
30. NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., supra note 22 (discussing the impetus for the
Victim’s Rights Movements, which led to a surge in the use of restitution).
31. Anderson, supra note 18, at 148–49.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 611A.04.
35. NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., supra note 22.
36. MINN. STAT. § 611A.045(1)(a)(1)–(2).
37. State v. Jola, 409 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (“[Defendants] argue
that they should not be required to pay restitution because no specific findings were
made on their ability to pay and restitution should not be punitive. The purpose of
restitution is to compensate the victim and not rehabilitate the defendant.” (emphasis
added)).
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court-mandated restitution order, the defendant has a thirty-day
window in which to challenge the order,38 but then must make
payments (typically on a payment schedule generated by the
court)39 to a court administrator, who passes the money along to the
impacted individuals.40
The first appearance of a juvenile-specific restitution statute
in Minnesota appeared in 1999, when the Legislature brought forth
an act recodifying and clarifying procedures related to juvenile
delinquency and child protection.41 Though very general, the
juvenile restitution practices detailed within the 1999 statute
remain largely unchanged today. One study found that, both then
and now, juveniles with exposure to the criminal justice system
encounter a restitution process substantially similar to that
functioning within the adult court.42 Courts subject justice-involved
youth to the requirements contained within the general restitution
statutes, Minnesota Statutes Sections 611A.045 and 611A.04
(which provide an overview of what can be included in a restitution
request and order), along with one statute specific to the juvenile
restitution context, Section 260b.198. While only a few additional
requirements are imposed by Section 260b.198, the language used
to express these considerations is broad.43 After a trial court
adjudicates a child delinquent, “the court may order the child to
make reasonable restitution for such damage,”44 and failure to do so
(by not paying or falling behind on the court-generated payment
schedule) can result in a probation violation.45 Few Minnesota cases
have interpreted these statutory provisions in a manner that
provides concrete guidance to judges and attorneys alike, leading to
continued confusion about where the confines of restitution—
particularly juvenile restitution—truly lie.46

38. MINN. STAT. § 611A.045(3)(b).
39. MINN. STAT. § 611A.045.
40. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, MINN. OFF. OF PUB. SAFETY, MINNESOTA
RESTITUTION WORKING GROUP: REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, 6–7 (2015)
[hereinafter MINNESOTA RESTITUTION WORKING GROUP].
41. See 1999 Minn. Laws 616 (enacting new language involving juvenile-specific
restitution in Minnesota); MINN. STAT. § 260b.198.
42. Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 32 (stating that juvenile punishments should
be scaled below adult punishments).
43. See MINN. STAT. § 260b.198(1)(5).
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. MINN. STAT. § 260b.198(8).
46. See MINNESOTA RESTITUTION WORKING GROUP, supra note 40, at 6–7.
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While arguably unforeseen at its inception,47 restitution has
become one of the most common dispositions given to children and
teenagers in Minnesota at the conclusion of delinquency hearings.48
In 2016, the Hennepin County Department of Community
Corrections and Rehabilitation (DOCCR) identified 242 juveniles in
Minnesota’s Fourth Judicial District Court (Hennepin County) who
were paying off restitution orders.49 These individuals constituted
just over 20% of the justice-involved youth under DOCCR
jurisdiction.50 Of the 242 kids ordered to pay restitution, the largest
portion were adjudicated delinquent for misdemeanor offenses, 51
with property crimes making up the bulk of the restitution orders.52
In Hennepin County, the average age of an adolescent ordered to
pay restitution was 15.3 years,53 and the vast majority of these
adolescents were Black.54 Notably, the average age for Native and
Black youth who received restitution orders was lower than the
overall average, at 14 and 14.9, respectively.55
Because the Legislature gave Minnesota courts the statutory
authority to sentence these youth to restitution, it is surprising that
the Legislature did not also consider how child labor laws may be a
limiting factor in a fourteen- or fifteen-year-old’s ability to pay.
Although teenagers of age fourteen and older can legally work in
Minnesota,56 a number of regulations cap the number of hours and
timeframes during which individuals under sixteen can work, 57
thus making it difficult for a young teenager to spend substantive
47. See generally Galaway, supra note 21, at 5–6 (arguing, in 1977, that the
problem of the “indigent offender” is likely overstated, as most of the restitution
programs and orders are “modest” in scope (under $200), and that with the aid of a
payment plan, most offenders could cover their restitution obligations).
48. Sarah J. Batzli, Case Note, In re Welfare of L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985), 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 247, 253 (1987).
49. HENNEPIN CNTY. DEP’T OF CMTY. CORR. & REHAB., 2016 PROFILE OF
JUVENILES UNDER DOCCR JURISDICTION 2 (2017).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 5 (explaining that 40% of youth charged with misdemeanors received
restitution after their adjudication).
52. Compare id. at 9, with MINNESOTA RESTITUTION WORKING GROUP, supra
note 40, at 19, 34 (indicating that in statistics on the adult side of restitution,
restitution orders at both county and statewide levels were largely for felony
offenses).
53. HENNEPIN CNTY. DEP’T OF CMTY. CORR. & REHAB., supra note 49, at 3 fig.4
(tracking age at intake).
54. Id. at 4 fig.5.
55. Id.
56. Child
Labor
FAQS,
MINN.
DEP’T
OF
LAB.
& INDUSTRY,
https://www.dli.mn.gov/business/employment-practices/child-labor-faqs [perma.cc/
CZS9-K2YG].
57. Id.
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time working for pay—and, in turn, more difficult for a selfsupporting teenager to pay restitution. Just as in adult court, if a
child or teenager is unable to meet the requirements of their
restitution order, their inability to comply with the terms of their
adjudication constitutes a probation violation,58 extending the
length of time they remain subject to close monitoring by the state.
If their restitution remains unpaid, in part or in full, the
outstanding amount becomes a civil judgment against justiceinvolved youth when they turn eighteen.59
C. Restitution’s Theoretical Goals
The past fifty years have seen a growing reliance on
restitution, which has been met with strong support from “both
juvenile justice practitioners . . . and the general public.”60
Academics who support juvenile restitution theorize that it makes
victims “whole”61 while simultaneously holding “offenders”
responsible for rectifying the damage that they caused. 62
Furthermore, these same scholars hypothesize that the process of
making court-ordered payments “aids in the rehabilitation of the
criminal.”63 Throughout the past few decades, researchers have
predicted that restitution will reduce recidivism by teaching justiceinvolved youth about accountability64 while instilling within these
individuals a “sense of accomplishment” for repairing the harms
they caused.65
Assuming this theory is correct, restitution serves two
laudable and essential goals: it compensates a victim for the
financial loss that they suffered while also “rehabilitating” the
individual responsible by forcing them to acknowledge the harm
they caused. Predicted to be a positive side effect, the hope has been
that the second component will reduce recidivism among the
justice-involved youth population.66 This two-part theory about
58. MINN. STAT. § 260b.198(8).
59. See Ruback, supra note 12, at 1794.
60. Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 32.
61. Richard E. Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its Past History and an
Analysis of Its Present Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 71, 80 (1970); see also Linda F.
Frank, The Collection of Restitution: An Often Overlooked Service to Crime Victims,
8 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 107, 119–20, 134 (1992).
62. Ruback, supra note 12, at 1790–91.
63. Laster, supra note 61, at 80.
64. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RESTITUTION BY JUVENILES: INFORMATION AND
OPERATING GUIDE FOR RESTITUTION PROGRAMS 3 (1988); see also Jacobs & Moore,
supra note 25, at 4.
65. Ruback, supra note 12, at 1791.
66. Id.
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restitution has inspired scholars and practitioners to categorize
restitution as a restorative justice67 program.68 In that vein, many
practitioners, guided by the view that restitution employs
restorative rather than punitive justice, have advocated for an
increased reliance on restitution in the juvenile justice system to
better prioritize rehabilitation over punishment.69 Some of these
same practitioners anticipate that parents will pay the (presumably
manageable) restitution orders juveniles receive.70
But of the two idealistic goals identified by scholars, only one
seems to matter in practice: making payments. In studies spanning
multiple decades, scholars across the U.S. have attempted to study
the effectiveness or “success” of restitution by tracking how many
restitution orders were fulfilled71 and, in a few cases, whether the
justice-involved youth recidivated.72 While these are important
metrics to track, these studies leave many other measures of
success unaddressed. Notably absent from these studies are
meaningful qualitative measures of whether the justice-involved
youth felt a sense of accomplishment after paying down their debt,
or whether the restitution process taught them lessons about
accountability or the wrongfulness of their acts. Also absent is any
data conclusively indicating that juvenile restitution programs are
successful; restitution payment rates differ dramatically from state
to state73 and, in general, a high percentage of youth fail to pay their
restitution.74 While some studies have traced a connection between
paying restitution and a decrease in recidivism,75 the practitioners
of these studies admit that this connection might be more indicative
of the socioeconomic status of the child’s family than the

67. Id. at 1798 (“Restorative justice practices assume that the justice process is
about repairing the harm from a crime in a way that balances the needs of the victim,
the community, and the offender.”).
68. Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 33.
69. See supra note 10 (discussing the United States Supreme Court’s recognition
of a rehabilitative framework in juvenile law).
70. Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 37.
71. See Sudipto Roy, Two Types of Juvenile Restitution Programs in Two
Midwestern Counties: A Comparative Study, 57 FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1993 at 48; see
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RESTITUTION BY JUVENILES, supra note 64, at 3; Jacobs &
Moore, supra note 25, at 3.
72. Roy, supra note 71, at 48.
73. Hager, supra note 4 (noting that 87% of orders were paid in Connecticut,
while only 28% of orders were paid in Mississippi).
74. See Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 37.
75. Id. at 37–38.
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rehabilitative effect of restitution.76 Ultimately, the many gaps in
these data suggest that the strong support juvenile restitution has
received is not supported by equally strong results confirming
restitution’s effectiveness.
II. The Need for Restorative Justice in the Juvenile
Delinquency System and Restitution’s Shortcomings
The U.S. Supreme Court has held in a recent string of
landmark cases77 that children are constitutionally different than
adults when it comes to sentencing and punishment. 78 As science,
social science, and common sense79 demonstrate, juveniles who
commit criminal acts of even the most serious caliber possess both
diminished culpability—due to many factors, including their
immaturity, vulnerability to negative influences, inability to control
the environment in which they are situated, and malleable
character traits80—and a heightened capacity to change as they
grow older.81 Each of these Supreme Court decisions was rooted in
the belief that the vast majority of justice-involved youth are
capable of rehabilitation,82 and that the applicable punishments
must be adjusted accordingly.83
Courts across the country followed suit by recognizing that
juveniles are inherently different than adults, 84 and that
rehabilitation rather than punishment must be the focus of juvenile

76. Id. at 51 (“In other words, juveniles who paid a greater percentage of their
economic sanctions might have come from families with greater means to pay and
might have been less likely to recidivate in the first place.”).
77. See supra note 10 (discussing cases in which the United States Supreme
Court recognized a rehabilitative framework in juvenile law).
78. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 460–62 (2012). See Christopher Northrop &
Kristina Rothley Rozan, Kids Will Be Kids: Time for a Reasonable Child Standard
for the Proof of Objective Mens Rea Elements, 69 ME. L. REV. 109, 111–12 (2017) for
an interesting discussion inspired by this Supreme Court precedent that advocates
for a different standard of reasonableness for children in criminal proceedings in
recognition of the differences in brain functioning and culpability between juveniles
and adults.
79. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (finding support for the
Court’s conclusions in psychology and brain science, but also in what “any parent
knows” about how kids think and impulsively act).
80. Id. at 569–70.
81. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–72.
82. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733–34 (2016).
83. But see Jones v. Mississippi, no. 18-1259, slip op. R-30 at 5 (Apr. 22, 2021)
(finding a sentencing judge has discretion to impose a lesser sentence than life
without parole, but may institute a life-without-parole sentence without making any
explicit or implicit finding of “permanent incorrigibility”).
84. See Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 32.
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delinquency courts.85 This shift is visible in the implementation of
restorative justice practices in juvenile courts nationwide. Unlike
punitive responses to transgressions, which calculate offenses in
terms of laws broken or property damaged, restorative justice
focuses on the ways that wrongdoings harm people and
relationships.86 When properly implemented in a court setting,
restorative justice often features a formal process administered by
the state and an informal process led by the community.87 The latter
component, which typically involves practices like Victim Offender
Mediation (VOM) or other face-to-face discussions between the
victim and offender, attempts to balance the needs of all parties
while reintegrating the offender peacefully and thoughtfully into
their community.88
A. Juvenile Restitution Falls Short of “Restorative” in
Hennepin County, Minnesota
In Minnesota (as in many other states), courts have begun to
classify restitution programs as one of the “restorative justice”
initiatives available to children adjudicated delinquent.89 In some
of the jurisdictions where they are used, restorative juvenile
restitution initiatives require the justice-involved youth to
participate in dialogues with the individuals impacted by their
wrongful acts;90 other programs see juveniles partaking in the VOM
process while simultaneously working to pay down their restitution
orders.91 In Hennepin County, however, where the juvenile
restitution program closely mirrors its adult equivalent, there are
no mandatory VOM mediations, no meetings, and virtually no
communication between the juveniles ordered to pay restitution

85. See id.
86. MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET, JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT: JUVENILE JUSTICE
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 47 (2018) [hereinafter MINN. JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT].
Rather than asking “what law was broken, who broke it and what punishment is
deserved,” restorative justice requires a legal and social community to ask who was
harmed, what this person’s needs might be, and how those needs can be met. Lara
Bazelon, Oakland Demonstrates Right Way to Use Restorative Justice with Teens,
JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Jan. 3, 2019), https://jjie.org/2019/01/03/oaklanddemonstrates-right-way-to-use-restorative-justice-with-teens/
[perma.cc/77SCDZCJ].
87. Ruback, supra note 12, at 1798.
88. See id.
89. MINN. JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 86, at 47. But cf. State v. Jola,
409 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (declaring that the goal of restitution is not
rehabilitation but simply payment to the victim).
90. Roy, supra note 71, at 49.
91. See Lucas, supra note 20, at 1375.
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and the individual(s) they are paying it to.92 Rather, the restitution
process is boiled down to its most basic bureaucratic components: a
judge adjudicates a child delinquent, orders them to pay restitution,
places them on a payment schedule, and requires the child to pay a
designated amount to a court administrator on a court-mandated
basis.93 Nevertheless, the State of Minnesota lists restitution
among the restorative justice programs it utilizes.94
At a theoretical level, restitution processes like that
implemented in Hennepin County may be classified as “restorative”
because some academics speculate that a nebulous, philosophical
change occurs when youth are held monetarily accountable for their
wrongdoings.95 In practice, however, the theoretical effectiveness of
restitution towards reducing recidivism and rehabilitating children
who have committed crimes remains unproven.96 Studies
increasingly suggest that emotional accountability does not
necessarily accompany monetary accountability, especially when all
that is required of justice-involved youth is that they pay a bill to
the court.97 Children from affluent backgrounds may receive
financial support from their families,98 while children from families
that are already in debt or struggling to pay their bills simply
accumulate more debt, thereby reducing their (already limited)
family income.99 For children in this second category, the
accumulation of debt—paired with the reduction in job prospects
that follows a criminal record—counterintuitively increases the
likelihood of a child’s ongoing involvement with the justice
system.100
Taken together, the lack of clarity about whether restitution
produces recidivism or emotional accountability and the clear

92. See MINNESOTA RESTITUTION WORKING GROUP, supra note 40, at 6 (grouping
adult and juvenile cases in the explanation of the statutory scheme guiding “ordering
restitution” in Minnesota).
93. See id.
94. MINN. JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 86, at 47.
95. See Jacobs & Moore, supra note 25, at 4.
96. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
97. See generally Hager, supra note 4 (discussing both the merits and
ineffectiveness of restitution).
98. See, e.g., Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 51.
99. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 17, at 1756.
100. See id.; see also Northrop & Rozan, supra note 78, at 112 (discussing a
juvenile criminal record’s potential impact on future educational, employment, and
housing opportunities). For an in-depth analysis of the unexpected and
counterintuitive impacts of well-meaning criminal justice reforms, see MAYA
SCHENWAR & VICTORIA LAW, PRISON BY ANY OTHER NAME: THE HARMFUL
CONSEQUENCES OF POPULAR REFORMS (2020).
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socioeconomic disparities impacting outcomes suggest that a
practical process in Hennepin County that strips juvenile
restitution of any mediation, dialogue, or interaction between
offender and victim cannot be considered conclusively restorative.
In practice, such a system imposes an uneven punitive burden and
likely makes it difficult for many juvenile offenders to reach a point
of restorative change. True restorative justice directly “involves
offenders . . . in deciding how to make amends for their crimes,
rather than relegating them to being ‘the passive objects of
punishment.’”101 Thus, when court systems focus solely on ordering
restitution for a justice-involved child to pay, the “emotional issues
surrounding crime and victimization, including even the possibility
of forgiveness and reconciliation” remain unaddressed.102
B. Restorative Justice Requires More than Restitution
Payments Alone
Stand-alone restitution orders will not bring restorative
justice to juvenile court in Hennepin County, as restorative justice
requires a sense of human connection and interpersonal
understanding that is unlikely to be generated by sending a check
to a court administrator. Other jurisdictions have adjusted their
juvenile restitution processes to embrace the principles of
restorative justice—and studies hint at the positive outcomes of this
approach.
In a study tracking the impact of VOM on restitution payment
in Minneapolis and Albuquerque, researchers found that juvenile
offenders who participated in VOM while paying down restitution
were statistically more likely to pay their restitution than
individuals who received a restitution order without also attending
mediation.103 The same participants in VOM programming
committed fewer and less serious crimes than their counterparts
who were subject to traditional programming.104 Other studies have

101. Lucas, supra note 20, at 1372.
102. Id. at 1399 (quoting MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE
IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION 157–58 (1994)).
103. See id. at 1375 n.58 (“‘Offenders who negotiated restitution agreements with
their victims through a process of mediation were considerably more likely to
actually complete their restitution obligation than similar offenders who were
ordered by the court to pay a set amount of restitution.’ In . . . [a] Minneapolis study,
69% of offenders in a VOM program paid restitution, compared to 54% who did not
go through the mediation process. In Albuquerque . . . 86% of offenders paid full
restitution following VOM compared to 57% of the non-mediation offenders.”
(citations omitted)).
104. Id.
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similarly indicated that programs involving face-to-face meetings
are more effective than remote, court-based programs.105 Of course,
creative and restorative solutions may extend well beyond VOM
and face-to-face interaction; other practitioners have called for a
greater reliance upon community service for which juveniles receive
an hourly stipend.106 While the theories supporting this approach
employ similar rationales to the traditional theories celebrating
juvenile restitution107—i.e., by working many hours for an hourly
wage, children are forced to reckon with the amount of harm they
caused and their role in repairing it—the community service aspect
aligns it more precisely with restorative justice. While working to
pay back individuals harmed by their wrongful acts, justiceinvolved youth who volunteer are made aware of their role within a
community, and hopefully begin to understand that their actions
can either harm their community or strengthen it.108
Currently, a limited version of paid restorative justice is
present in Hennepin County in its Sentence to Service (STS)
programming, which allows juveniles to volunteer on weekends to
pay off a restitution order.109 An expansion of this program, paired
with VOM programming or other opportunities for discussion
between all impacted parties, may push Hennepin County’s
juvenile restitution from the punitive to the restorative realm.
Importantly, the input of both victim and offender is considered
essential to true restorative justice: the person who did something
wrong and the individual(s) impacted by these actions must both
show a willingness to work through hard feelings to reach an
agreement.110 These agreements should look different depending on
the unique parties involved; thus, any true restorative system of
105. See Roy, supra note 71, at 48.
106. See Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 52.
107. See id. at 33, 52.
108. It is important to note that, like restitution, court-mandated community
service could be more rehabilitative in theory than in practice. See, e.g., SCHENWAR
& LAW, supra note 100, at 51–57, 89 (arguing that many prison reform efforts,
including probation and court-ordered treatment, continue to have harmful impacts
on the lives of individuals). For example, probation has been identified as “one of the
most significant drivers of mass incarceration” despite typically being used to avoid
prison time. Id. at 87. While, in theory, community service enables rehabilitation
and aligns with restorative justice ideals, certain implementations of this practice
could result in forced, punitive community service (think: a chain gang). To combat
this from happening, juvenile courts hoping to implement community service should
allow justice-involved youth to have some autonomy over where they volunteer, and
how and when they serve their communities.
109. See Sentencing to Service, HENNEPIN CNTY. https://www.hennepin.us/
residents/public-safety/sentencing-service [perma.cc/8ZPK-AJA9].
110. See Ruback, supra note 12, at 1798.
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accountability must eschew the rigidity of our current juvenile
delinquency system to embrace a more flexible, open approach to
justice. Though daunting, this task may see more success in
addressing the emotional issues surrounding crime 111 and,
surprisingly, save the court systems a substantial amount of
money.112
III. An Overhaul of Juvenile Restitution in Hennepin
County: Large (and Small) Changes Towards a More
Equitable Institution
As it currently operates, Hennepin County’s system of juvenile
restitution fails to function in a rehabilitative or restorative
manner. Despite their lessened culpability and heightened capacity
to change, children and teenagers adjudicated delinquent face a
restitution process functionally equivalent to that used in Hennepin
County’s adult court. Restitution in Minnesota, though part of the
adult court system for nearly forty years and the juvenile system
for over twenty,113 has been subject to restrained judicial
interpretation and few structural changes.114 Without requiring
regular analysis of the financial statuses of justice-involved
youth,115 courts continue to order restitution payments in
increasingly high amounts116 and, if the juvenile with a restitution
order cannot or does not meet their payments, they both violate
their probation and carry a debt with them from childhood into
adulthood. As a disproportionate number of juveniles entering the
criminal justice system live in poverty,117 this debt unevenly
burdens those who are already struggling financially and plunges
them deeper into the cycle of poverty. This, in turn, makes it more
difficult for them to increase household wealth and reach financial

111. See Lucas, supra note 20, at 1399.
112. See id. at 1375.
113. See Act of May 11, 1999, ch. 139, § 30, 1999 Minn. Laws 616–18 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 260b.198); Anderson, supra note 18, at 148.
114. See Anderson, supra note 18, at 148.
115. See In re Welfare of L.F.M., No. A13-0541, 2013 WL 5778221, at *3 (Minn.
Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2013) (citing State v. Jola, 409 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987))
(stating that “[a] district court does not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution
without specific findings regarding the defendant’s ability to pay, even if there is a
potential financial hardship to the defendant.”).
116. See Galaway, supra note 21, at 5 (noting that in the early days of restitution,
orders did not typically stretch beyond $200).
117. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 53, 70–79 (2012).
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stability, while simultaneously increasing the likelihood that the
youth will reoffend.118
In addition to exploring the impacts restitution may have on
justice-involved youth, the conversation on juvenile restitution
must not overlook its impacts on victims harmed by the actions of
justice-involved youth. Restitution was so widely implemented not
just to hold youth accountable, but also to ease the financial and
psychological harms experienced by victims.119 In many cases,
restitution is a service that is valuable to—and, at times,
desperately needed by—victims of crime.120 Yet, as discussed in
further detail above, studies suggest that many restitution orders
remain unpaid, 121 and the parties waiting for compensation fail to
receive it. This statistic is particularly salient when considering the
population of justice-involved youth, which is disproportionally
poor122 and, as a result of youth, less likely to have employment (not
to mention well-paid employment). Restitution programs cannot
make a victim whole if the person ordered to pay restitution simply
cannot afford to pay it.
Like many broader aspects of the criminal justice system—
and, as some argue, many broader aspects of well-intentioned,
popular criminal justice reforms123—Hennepin County’s local
process of juvenile restitution falls short of its stated goals. Yet
changes at the county- and state-wide levels can begin the process
of fixing it, thus bettering the experience for justice-involved youth
and the people harmed by their actions.
A. Statutory Interpretation of Minnesota Statutes Sections
260b.198 and 611A.045
As noted previously, the statutes most applicable to juvenile
restitution, Minnesota Statutes Sections 260b.198 and 611A.045,
each discuss the restitution process in broad terms. The court,
Section 611A.045 explains, shall consider the economic loss
sustained by the victim as well as the income, resources, and
118. See Harris et al., supra note 12, at 1761.
119. See Ruback, supra note 12, at 1783.
120. See id. at 1789 (explaining that, statistically, victims of crime are often
demographically similar to the perpetrators of the crime: disproportionately poor).
121. See Hager, supra note 4 (noting that “[c]ourts’ success in collecting juvenile
restitution varies by state” and “[f]or amounts of more than $10,000, the payment
rate is nearly zero in many states.”).
122. See Birckhead, supra note 117, at 58 (stating that “[j]uvenile courts have
traditionally been considered the courts of the poor and impoverished”).
123. See generally SCHENWAR & LAW, supra note 100 (discussing the unintended
negative consequences stemming from prevalent criminal justice practices).

2021]

Paying Unpayable Debts

405

obligations of the defendant.124 When a child causes such economic
loss, Section 260b.198 additionally requires that a court order
“reasonable restitution” for the damage.125 Both statutes are broad
enough to allow for a rigorous restitution process that fully
evaluates the financial obligations and limitations of a defendant
before ordering restitution to be paid, or for a process devoid of such
an individual analysis. In interpreting these statutes, Minnesota
courts have not only adopted the second approach, but have
declared that courts need not make any specific findings about an
offender’s ability to pay.126
This is a problem. While a child’s ability to pay is incorporated
in relevant statutes, it is too often absent from the balancing test
used by judges. In a recent report requested by the Legislature,127
the Minnesota Department of Public Safety’s Restitution Working
Group identified this precise issue as a major roadblock in the
restitution process.128 Quoting the adage “[y]ou can’t get blood from
a turnip,”129 the Restitution Working Group acknowledged that the
major reason why so many Minnesota restitution orders go unpaid
is perhaps the most simple reason: people don’t have the ability to
pay them.130 The Group went on to recommend the State adopt a
standard, objective process to assess an individual’s ability to pay
restitution so that orders will be realistic rather than unpayable. 131
Increasingly, jurisdictions outside of Minnesota are
considering such an approach. 132 Notably, Maine’s Legislature
suggested revamping their restitution statutes to include monetary
caps on juvenile restitution,133 while other jurisdictions with
statutes similar to Minnesota’s must consider ability to pay. In
Indiana, for example, the vagueness surrounding one’s ability to
pay is removed: rather than suggesting that courts “consider”
ability to pay, as Minnesota does, Indiana law mandates that

124. MINN. STAT. § 611A.045(1).
125. MINN. STAT. § 260B.198(1)(a)(5).
126. In re Welfare of L.F.M., No. A13-0541, 2013 WL 5778221, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Oct. 28, 2013) (citing State v. Jola, 409 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)).
127. MINNESOTA RESTITUTION WORKING GROUP, supra note 40.
128. Id. at 12.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Hager, supra note 4; see, e.g., David & Bradford, supra note 14, at 1080
(discussing Indiana’s approach).
133. See Hager, supra note 4 (tracing the Maine Legislature’s attempts to limit
the use of restitution and impose an $800 cap on orders given to juveniles).
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restitution orders may not exceed a person’s ability to pay.134 To
support this policy, trial courts are required to determine a party’s
financial obligations and earnings, and often consider additional
factors that impact ability to pay, such as the defendant’s health
and employment history.135 While critics sometimes balk at the
addition of “ability to pay” to the restitution calculation due to
supposed complications in determining financial ability,136 states
like Indiana demonstrate that a quick and holistic review of an
individual’s finances, earning capacity, financial obligations, and
preexisting debt provides a solid starting point.
While a massive restitution overhaul might benefit Hennepin
County (more on that below), small adjustments in statutory
interpretation may also benefit all involved parties. As a state-wide
measure, Minnesota courts should take seriously their obligation
under Minnesota Statutes Section 611A.045 to, at the very least,
consider each individual offender’s ability to pay. In following the
status quo in interpreting restitution statutes, Minnesota courts
effectively overlook a specific statutory requirement and perpetuate
a cycle of debt that harms justice-involved youth and deprives
victims of their promised restitution. Hennepin County courts
already have procedures in place to quickly evaluate an individual’s
financial resources in determining whether an individual is eligible
for a public defender 137 or capable of paying child support at the set
amount;138 a similar process could be implemented after said
individual is found guilty or adjudicated delinquent to determine
how much restitution they could conceivably pay.
An additional statutory requirement in Minnesota Statutes
Section 260b.198 mandates that restitution orders be reasonable. 139
As this requirement is incorporated in the juvenile—rather than the
134. IND. CODE § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(6) (2017); see also David & Bradford, supra note
14, at 1080.
135. See Bell v. State, 59 N.E.3d 959, 964 (Ind. 2016); Champlain v. State, 717
N.E.2d 567, 570 (Ind. 1999); Sales v. State, 464 N.E.2d 1336, 1340 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984); see also David & Bradford, supra note 14, at 1081.
136. Ruback, supra note 12, at 1806, 1809 (“Most courts do not have a written
plan for how . . . a determination [of an individual’s ability to pay] should be made”
and that “in the United States, determining ability to pay is not straightforward.”).
137. MINN. STAT. § 611.17.
138. For “ability to pay” assessments in calculating child support payments, see
MINN. STAT. § 518A.42; LYNN AVES, MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RSCH. DEP’T,
MINNESOTA’S CHILD SUPPORT LAWS 1, 8 (2015), https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/
hrd/pubs/chldsupp.pdf [perma.cc/55VK-ELX3] (explaining that low-income obligors
receive a “self-support adjustment,” and if an obligor’s income is less than 120% of
the poverty line, their payment is reduced to a “minimum support order” of
$50/month).
139. MINN. STAT. § 260b.198(1)(5).
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general—restitution statute, it should be read to have a juvenilespecific intent and effect.140 When financial resources and
limitations are discussed, few populations are more constrained
than the one that forms the bulk of the juvenile delinquency system:
low-income youth. Youth from working-class and poor families are
unlikely to receive significant support in paying off a restitution
order, as their parents may already be stretched thin by bills and
debts. Further, even if these children are old enough to work and
have their own jobs, income generated from employment is often
diverted to family bills or an individual’s need to self-support.141
With these realities in mind, “reasonable” restitution for
juveniles begins to take form. It must be within an offender’s ability
to pay, and their ability to pay on their own must be considered, as
financial support from adults is simply not an option for many in
Hennepin County and Minnesota at large. Ideally, reasonable
restitution would not extend beyond a certain dollar amount;
accordingly, a cap on restitution in juvenile court may be
appropriate.
B. Changes at the County Level
While the Minnesota Legislature would likely need to initiate
many of these proposed restitution reforms, Hennepin County has
the ability to independently enact changes to strengthen its juvenile
restitution process.
As discussed in Part II, one change beneficial to offenders and
victims alike involves incorporating Victim Offender Mediation or
expanding the paid community service program to make restitution
a true vehicle of restorative justice. While these measures may
initially pose up-front training or implementation costs, they have
the potential to reduce expenses incurred by the juvenile
delinquency system (via a decrease in reliance on traditional court
140. Support for interpreting the word “reasonable” in a substantive and
meaningful way can be found in the presumption against surplus language, a
semantic canon traditionally utilized in statutory interpretation. This canon of
construction argues that a statute should be interpreted to give meaning to every
word and avoid redundancy or futility of language.
141. It is not uncommon for children from poor and working-class families to work
a part-time job so that they can contribute to household expenses. See Darryl E.
Owens, More Teens Working to Pay Family Bills, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 3, 1998),
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-1998-03-03-9803020728-story.html
[perma.cc/Y7DA-HDBC] (discussing a nationwide trend). As such, this is another
important but often obscured factor to consider in the conversation about juvenile
restitution and its impact: if already-employed youth must shift wages from family
necessities to restitution programs, how does that impact their families?
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proceedings).142 Further, true restorative justice actually can
achieve the philosophical and emotional changes scholars hoped for
restitution, as lessons of accountability and community
interconnectedness are instilled through the restorative process.143
Additionally, Hennepin County should consider supporting a
program or stand-alone fund for juvenile restitution. Though a
monetary fund would inevitably impose an additional expense on
the county, having such a fund would ensure victims of crime
receive their restitution without imposing an effectively unpayable
debt upon children. This fund would not need to cover the full extent
of a restitution order, but rather could be used to cover part of the
court-mandated payment. After a court determines a justiceinvolved youth’s ability to pay, any excess restitution outside of the
child’s ability to pay could be taken from the fund. Similarly, if a
statutory cap on restitution was imposed, any required restitution
beyond the cap could be met using the fund. In these instances, so
long as VOM or other face-to-face programs are also in place, the
supposed benefits of restitution are still operational: young people
who break the law are held accountable and forced to reckon with
the harm they caused, yet this reckoning does not set them up for a
lifetime of debt and a constricted future.
Conclusion
Although it is viewed as philosophically rehabilitative,
Hennepin County courts interpret and implement juvenile
restitution in a manner that often feels punitive. Justice-involved
youth, who disproportionately come from low-income families, are
saddled with restitution orders that are impractical—if not
impossible—for them to pay. This debt follows them from youth into
adulthood, molding their future successes and stresses. This Note
suggests that this process is flawed: the purpose of our juvenile
delinquency system is not to expose kids to the punitive measures
employed during adult sentencing, but to treat children in a manner
that recognizes them as children and acknowledges their capacity
to change.
For juvenile restitution to achieve these ends, it must weave
community connections into payment orders (either through VOM,
other mediation, or individualized community service projects).
Perhaps more importantly, Minnesota courts must start
interpreting the underlying restitution statutes (especially
142. Lucas, supra note 20, at 1375.
143. Ruback, supra note 12, at 1798.
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Minnesota Statutes Section 260b.198) to give effect to all provisions
in the statute, including the reasonableness and ability to pay
requirements.

